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REGULATING INTEROPERABILITY: LESSONS FROM
AT&T, MICROSOFF,AND BEYOND
PHILIP

J.

WEJSER*

In evaluating the history of judicially developed remedies to facilitate
competition in network industries, the AT&T and Microsoft cases provide an instructive set of contrasts for commentators and enforcers. As a
formal matter, the Department of Justice relied on different theories in
the two cases, but as a practical matter, both cases sought to address the
breakdown of trust in the relationship between a platform owner and
applications providers that rely upon that platform. By platform owner, I
mean a firm that controls a network, facility, or essential input that
those providing a complementary good or service (i.e., the "application") must rely on. In a notable variation on this theme, some of Standard Oil's critics alleged similar concerns to those addressed in the
Microsoft and AT&T cases, but approached the issue from the other direction, focusing on the abuse of market power by a provider of a "killer
application."' In the Standard Oil case, the platform was the railroads
and the "killer application" was the petroleum shipped by Standard Oil
(and coveted by the railroads. as a steady stream of revenue (and traffic)). Consequently, one can bookend the history of monopolization
remedies-at least from Standard Oil to Microsoft-as a story of the relationship between platforms and applications.
This article examines the inexorable tension between platforms and
applications, evaluating strategies for antitrust law to resolve that tension
and facilitate competition. In particular, antitrust courts face a considerable challenge in developing institutional strategies for superintending
monopolization remedies in this context. As Judge Richard Posner put
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. Thanks to Michael Carrier, Jim Delong,
Ray Gifford, Dale Hatfield, Adam Peters, Steve Semeraro, and Danny Sokol for helpful
comments, conversations, and criticisms that sharpened this article.
IFor a discussion of the Standard Oil case and how vertical relationships can facilitate
the creation of monopoly power, see generally Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "RaisingRivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1996).
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it, "The real problem [facing antitrust law] lies on the institutional side:
the enforcement agencies and the courts do not have adequate technical resources, and do not move fast enough, to cope effectively with a
2
very complex business sector that changes very rapidly."
This article highlights two strategies for addressing this challenge.
First, it recommends that antitrust law not be viewed as the sole tool-or
even necessarily the best one-for managing conflicts between platforms and applications. 3 Second, it calls on antitrust law to exercise increased creativity and experimentation-and offers some guidelines for
doing so-as courts and commentators devise institutional strategies to
guide both antitrust oversight and antitrust remedies in a technologically dynamic environment.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the nature of the
monopolization theories and remedies developed in the antitrust actions against AT&T and Microsoft. Part II evaluates, at a higher level of
generality, the inexorable tension between platform owners and applications providers, discussing the challenge that this often-contentious relationship creates for antitrust law. Part III suggests how an appreciation
for the role of standard-setting bodies in addressing interoperability issues can help address some of the seemingly insoluble challenges that
confront antitrust enforcers in this context. Finally, Part IV offers a short
conclusion.
I. AT&T, MICROSOFT, AND ANTITRUST OVERSIGHT
Antitrust law generally takes the position that rivals have no duty to
deal with one another. 4 Nonetheless, the exceptions to this doctrine
raise particularly interesting, important, and challenging cases. For over
the last twenty years, much of the debate over the nature of the antitrust
duty to deal obligation focused on the Aspen Skiing case, 5 which determined that a three-mountain ski resort violated the Sherman Act by dis2Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925 (2001).

3As Herbert Hovenkamp put it, antitrust law only constitutes one tool in the competition policy toolkit, which should be understood to encompass "the full range of public
rules and sanctions designed to ensure that markets are as competitive as they can realistically be. . . ." Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of CompetitionPolicy, 60 ALA.
L. REv. 103, 104 (2008).
4See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (offering this dictum);
see also Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to DealWhy Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 659 (2001) ("The antitrust
doctrine of a duty to deal automatically creates a tension because the antitrust laws are
premised on the simple notion that rivalry among firms benefits consumers, yet a doctrine of a duty to deal clearly limits that rivalry.").
5
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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continuing a cooperative relationship with a rival (i.e., the joint offering
of a four-mountain pass) on the ground that this decision had the purpose and effect of excluding an otherwise equally efficient rival from the
market. 6 More recently, in light of Verizon v. Trinko's dictum that "Aspen
is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability,"7 some have suggested
that this doctrine is either truly exceptional or is effectively overruled.8
For owners of dominant network facilities, this suggestion is a welcome
one. If the past is prologue, however, even the Trinko dictum will not
erase the role for antitrust oversight of cooperation (or lack thereof)
between rivals in network industries. Indeed, antitrust courts have a long
history of addressing such issues. 9
The justification for antitrust oversight of cooperative arrangements
between rivals is that there are certain types of industries or sets of circumstances where, as Judge Posner put it, "cooperation is indispensable
to effective competition." 0 In such markets, antitrust courts will sometimes be asked to evaluate whether the conduct of the dominant firm
has the effect of "denying consumers the full benefits of technological
progress that a dynamically competitive market would offer.""1 Such requests for antitrust oversight are almost certain to continue because, at
least in network industries, cooperation is essential for rivals of dominant firms to have any chance of success in the marketplace. 2 As a result, there is always the potential for courts to conclude that a firm's
refusal to cooperate with its rivals reflects a predatory strategy rather
than legitimate business conduct. The antitrust cases against AT&T and
Microsoft reflected an effort by antitrust enforcers to develop both a
substantive vision for a duty to deal requirement as well as an institutional strategy for enforcing it. In Section A, I evaluate the legacy of the
6 See, e.g., Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and "Sacrifice,"73 ANnr-

L.J. 171, 175-79 (2005).
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004).
8 Eleanor M. Fox, The Trouble with Trinko, Address to the 52nd Annual ABA Antitrust
Section Spring Meeting 4 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/
at-committees/at-telecom/pdf/troublewithtrinko.pdf.
9 For a discussion of the application of antitrust law to network industries and a suggestion that current doctrines are ill-suited in this regard, see George Priest, Rethinking Antitrust Law in An Age of Network Industries (Yale L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 352, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1031166.
10Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir.
1986).
11Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 673, 674 (1999).
2 See CARL SH IRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 246 (1999) ("For as long as there have been networks, there has been
interconnection: passengers or cargo brought by one network to its extremities are carried farther along by an adjacent network.").
TRUST
7
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AT&T case in this light; in Section B, I discuss the antitrust cases against
Microsoft (both in the United States and in the European Union). By so
doing, I set up Part II's discussion of the inexorable tension between
platform owners and applications providers.
A.

UNITED STATES V.

AT&T

In United States v. AT&T, the Bell System faced an existential threat it
could hardly fathom. For almost a century, Bell viewed the concept of
independent applications that attached to its network as both a foreign
and offensive concept. Indeed, Bell termed "customer premises equipment" (or CPE, as it was often called) provided by independent firms as
"foreign attachments." Reflecting its hostility to this notion, it fought
tooth and nail against allowing the interconnection of such equipment
to its network, proffering an array of justifications why such technology
should be resisted (because it could create the risk of electrocuting central office personnel, for example) and inventing anticompetitive tactics
that artificially raised the costs of rivals who sought to market CPE to its
3
customers.'
Competition policy took a circuitous course to adopting a pro-entry
regime for CPE. Initially, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) sympathized with AT&T's arguments, ruling that the so-called
Hush-A-Phone device could not attach to consumer's telephones.' 4 After
the D.C. Circuit rejected this conclusion, the FCC ultimately concluded
that AT&T's arguments were specious and adopted a system of non-discriminatory interconnection enforced through its Part 68 rules. (These
rules specify an open interface for connection to the public switched
telephone network.' 5 ) Thus, by the time that the AT&T antitrust case
concluded, an effective remedial regime was already in place. With the
benefit of hindsight, the FCC's Part 68 regime (which was reinforced by
the AT&T antitrust consent decree) is viewed as an enormous success,
13See, e.g., Litton Sys. Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983).
14Famously, the Hush-A-Phone was a cup-like device used to muffle phone conversations and ensure a greater level of privacy-i.e., prevent those nearby from overhearing
conversations. AT&T took the position, upheld by the FCC and reversed by the D.C. Circuit, that this device was a "foreign attachment" barred by its tariff. See Hush-A-Phone
Corp., Decision, 20 F.C.C. 391 (1955), rev'd, 238 F.2d 266 (1956).
15Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report & Order, 56
F.C.C.2d 593, 594-96 (1975), modified, 58 F.C.C.2d 716, modified, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976),
affid sub nom. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977). Notably, this regime has become sufficiently straightforward to oversee that the FCC has
charged third parties with its administration. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review of Part
68 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Report & Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 24,944
(2000).
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bringing competition to existing markets (i.e., cheaper, higher quality,
and more choice in telephones) and, more importantly, facilitating the
development of new markets and products, such as the modem industry
and, ultimately, the Internet.
The development of competition in the equipment manufacturing
market depended on the specification of a clear interface that was not
6
subject to manipulation and was subject to a zero-price access regime.'
By contrast, the AT&T consent decree-rather than prior regulatory decisions-facilitated the emergence of competition in the long-distance
market. In particular, the decree enabled independent long-distance
firms like MCI and Sprint to compete with AT&T on equal footing, both
through the assurance of equal access requirements (embodied in the
consent decree, but enforced by the FCC) and a structural remedy that
separated AT&T's long-distance arm from its local network (which provided the necessary input to long-distance service).17 The theory of the
equal access requirements was that the independent long-distance firms
should be afforded equal access to the local network (vis-a-vis AT&T)both in terms of price and quality (e.g., not having to dial extra digits).18
The AT&T consent decree's ability to spur competition in long distance is widely viewed in a favorable light and as a credit to the importance of antitrust law as a competition policy strategy. For years,
regulators had failed to address adequately the lack of equal access to
the local Bell Companies' local networks and long-distance-firms made
only a small dent in AT&T's dominant market share. Reflecting that
fact, Judge Greene credited the testimony of two former FCC officials
that "the Commission is not and never has been capable of effective
enforcement of the laws governing AT&T's behavior."' 9 As noted above,
this point is debatable as to competition in customer premises equip-

16 For an excellent discussion of the economics (and common sense) behind this conclusion, see Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 73 (2003).
17 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving the
break-up of AT&T and the imposition of equal access mandates to address AT&T's discriminatory practices against long distance competitors and rival equipment manufacturers), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
IS See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 225-26 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of Appendix
B(C) (3), whenever, as permitted by the decree, a separated BOC fails to offer exchange
access to an interexchange carrier that is equal in type and quality to that provided for the
interexchange traffic of AT&T, the tariffs filed for such less-than-equal access shall reflect
the lesser cost, if any, of such access as compared to the exchange access provided
AT&T.-).
1)Id. at 168.
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ment, but it is difficult to dispute as to the long-distance sector.20 Moreover, in the wake of the AT&T consent decree, the change in the nature
of competition in long distance was palpable, with MCI and Sprint, as
21
well as subsequent entrants, making huge strides in the marketplace.
The advent of competition in the long-distance market also interacted
with the introduction of competition in the equipment sector in significant ways because MCI and Sprint became major purchasers of advanced communications technology. In particular, the decisions of
those firms-emboldened by the AT&T consent decree-enabled Dow
Corning, which had invented fiber optic cable and failed to sell it to
AT&T, to develop its innovation and transform communications tech22
nology as a result.

The AT&T consent decree's belt and suspenders strategy for promoting competition in long distance has come under recent scholarly criticism. To both Judge Greene and William Baxter (the head of the
Antitrust Division who entered into the decree), the rationale for a
break-up of the Bell System was impeccable: the Bell Companies, which
were subject to rate regulation, faced a powerful incentive to leverage
their monopoly position into adjacent markets and needed to be quar-

20 Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization
Cases, 80 OR. L. REv. 109, 183-84 (2001) (explaining that AT&T "often denied the nascent competitors interconnection with its network facilities or at least delayed such interconnection through aggressive exploitation of the available regulatory processes" and that
the antitrust. case against AT&T emphasized that "AT&T's ownership of local operating
companies had provided it with the incentive and the ability to exclude competitors in
long-distance services and telecommunications equipment manufacture by denying competitors interconnection with the local Bell operating companies").
21 Id. at 191.
22 See Gino Cattani, Technological Pre-Adaptation,Speciation, and Emergence of New Technologies: How Corning Invented and Developed Fiber Optics, 15 INDUS. & CoRPu. CHANGE 285, 309
(2006) (explaining the incentives that led AT&T to ignore the development of this technology); Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 85, 107-08 (2000). AT&T's decision not to deploy
fiber optic technology was related to its dominance of these markets. It has been related
that
AT&T, which owned most of the telephone lines in America at the time [of the
invention of fiber optic technology], said it would be 30 years before its telephone system would be ready for optical fiber. And when it was, AT&T planned
to make its own fiber ....
[After AT&T entered into a consent decree,] MCI
took the risk [of ordering fiber optic technology] and placed a 100,000 kilometer order for a new generation of fiber.
Willard K Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate
Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANRITRUST L.J. 167, 202 (1997) (quoting Testimony of Timothy
J. Regan, Division Vice President and Director of Public Policy, Coming, Inc., Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1995 WL 269771 (May 9, 1995)).
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antined to the local market. 23 With the benefit of hindsight, some scholars have advanced two lines of criticism about the decree. First, they
question whether the risks of vertical integration merited the administrative and consumer costs that emerged from a quarantine solution.
Second, they claim that the antitrust court overlooked the possibility of
using a standalone conduct remedy-i.e., the equal access rules-that
would have led to a substantially similar outcome without the administrative costs and inefficiencies attendant to the structural remedy. Without a true counterfactual, it is difficult (and perhaps impossible) to
settle the debate over either claim, but Robert Crandall argues that the
experience in other countries suggests strongly that the imposition of
equal access rules alone is sufficient to generate a competitive long-dis24
tance market.
Crandall's critique that structural relief was unduly invasive and that a
more surgical behavioral remedy (i.e., the equal access requirement)
would have been equally effective standing alone warrants serious consideration. Such a claim may be true in certain cases and, at a minimum,
raises important questions about what institutional strategies are optimal under different conditions.
As for Crandall's claim about the experience of other countries using
standalone equal access requirements, however, three factors potentially
distinguish those examples from the U.S. experience. First, there is no
way to know whether the standalone equal access rules could have been
implemented effectively in the United States without an attendant structural remedy because, as for the case of other countries, they were able
to learn from the earlier development of equal access arrangements in
the United States (which were more effective on account of the structural relief). In particular, because the Bell Companies were unable to
benefit financially from discriminatory access arrangements (on account
of their lack of participation in the adjacent markets), they had no incentive to frustrate the implementation of an equal access rule regime.
By contrast, the FCC's pre-U.S. v. AT&T efforts to impose equal access
arrangements in the context of the integrated Bell System stalled and
were ineffectual. Second, it is notable that other countries did not face
the monopsony purchasing problem created by the Bell System, which
undermined the development of competition in equipment manufacturing. Consider, for example, that the U.S. decree also imposed a re23

Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 105-07 (2003) (discussing "Baxter's Law").
2
4 Crandall, supra note 20, at 189.
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quirement that prohibited the Bell Companies "from discriminating
between AT&T and other companies in their procurement activities, the
establishment of technical standards, the dissemination of technical information, their use of Operating Company facilities and charges for
such use, and their network planning. 2 5 Just as the equal access conditions were implemented more effectively on account of the removal of
the incentive to discriminate, these conditions were more effective on
account of the divestiture of the Bell Companies from AT&T's equipment manufacturing arm. Finally, in many other countries, the government owned (at least in part) the telephone company, thereby enabling
it to exert a form of pressure on the incumbent provider that the U.S.
government could not use.
The case that a non-discriminatory interconnection requirement can
operate effectively absent structural relief is illustrated by the fact that
such requirements appear to function in a reasonably effective manner
in other contexts without the presence of attendant structural remedy.
The FCC superintends interconnection between wireless providers and
the wireline telephone network, for example, even where the incumbent Bell Companies arguably possessed the opportunity and incentive
to undermine the service quality of the cellular providers who were not
affiliated with them. In that context, both the FCC and Judge Greene
concluded that a quarantine solution was not necessary because regulation could use a benchmark-the type of arrangement offered to the
wireline-affiliated cellular provider-against which to evaluate the access
provided to other providers.2 6 Similarly, in enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress concluded that the Bell Companies could
*be allowed into the long-distance market without fear that they would
undermine competition in that market, provided that the local market
was opened to competition and the relevant benchmarks were first established. 27 Notably, both the FCC, in the case of wireless interconnection, and Congress, with respect to the Telecommunications Act,
initially insisted that the benchmark arrangement be tied to a structurally separate affiliate, but in both cases, the requirement was relaxed
once the equal access arrangements were shown to operate effectively.
Whether or not an equal access remedy could have succeeded as a
standalone remedy in the AT&T consent decree, it is clear that Judge
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 142.
Id. at 196 n.269; see also An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and
870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems, Report & Order, 86 F.C.C.2d 469
(1981).
2
7 See Marius Schwartz, The Economic Logic for ConditioningBell Entry into Long Distanceon
the Prior Opening of Local Markets, 18 J. REG.ECON. 247, 247-48 (2000).
25

216
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Greene recognized the importance of such relief in facilitating long distance competition. It is also clear that Judge Greene appreciated the
institutional considerations that antitrust courts must attend to in overseeing complex remedial schemes. In particular, Judge Greene recognized that some degree of flexibility and experimentation was
appropriate, remarking that "since the Bell System network is both vast
and complex, a variety of approaches will in all probability be necessary
to achieve equal access" and eschewing the "[i]mposition by the Court
of a single procedure applicable to all areas and all interconnection requirements ...."28 To that end, Judge Greene also relied greatly on the
FCC to superintend the relevant equal access arrangement, with the
court maintaining jurisdiction in the event that a party concluded that
the FCC had failed to act effectively. By so doing, Judge Greene both
acknowledged the possibility that the FCC would continue to be unable
to regulate effectively (although the imposition of structural relief made
that task far easier)2 9 and followed the Supreme Court's Otter Tail precedent of devising an antitrust remedy that could be overseen by a regula30
tory agency.
B. MICROsoFr's

ANTITRUST CHALLENGES

Alongside the AT&T case, the antitrust action against Microsoft is the
other high profile effort by the Justice Department to mandate interoperability between a platform owner and applications developers. 31 In
that case, the Justice Department challenged a number of Microsoft's
actions as part of an effort to maintain its monopoly in the market for
desktop computing operating systems.3 2 In particular, the Department
claimed that Microsoft sought to exclude Netscape's Navigator browser
as well as Sun's Java technology so as to thwart the possibility that those
technologies would serve as "middleware" that would commoditize
218
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 197.

29As Judge Greene concluded in the AT&T case: "The evidence adduced during the
AT&T trial indicates that the Bell System has been neither effectively regulated nor fully
subjected to true competition. The FCC officials themselves acknowledge that their regulation has been woefully inadequate to cope with a company of AT&T's scope, wealth, and
power." Id. at 170.
30See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); PhilipJ. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 16-17
(2003) (discussing Otter Tail precedent).
31 For a more in-depth discussion of that case than the one provided below, see Harry
First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust
Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641 (2006).
s2See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (D.D.C. Findings
1999) (findings of fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
(conclusions of law); United States v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (an
earlier action to enforce a 1994 consent decree).
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Microsoft's operating system and displace Microsoft's monopoly
power." In what proved to be the authoritative determination of the
case, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously ruled for the government on its core claim that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, remanding the case for further proceedings on the
appropriate remedy. 34 In the wake of that remand, the Justice Department and Microsoft settled on a set of conduct remedies, which were
3 5
upheld on appeal.
In short, Microsoft suggests that a platform monopolist must exercise
special care in terms of the type of cooperation-or lack thereof-it
offers to competitors. To be sure, such a requirement only applies when
the platform at issue is sufficiently entrenched as to be protected from
competition from rivals. In Microsoft, both the district court and the
court of appeals concluded that, among other things, the strong "network externalities" inherent in operating systems meant that any rival
operating system would find it extraordinarily difficult to displace
Microsoft's dominance and encourage application developers to create
software programs to run on a platform other than Windows.3 6 Consequently, both courts concluded that Microsoft possessed monopoly
power in the market for operating systems (whether defined as all
desktop computers or only Intel-compatible ones).
In holding a platform monopolist liable under the antitrust laws, the
Microsoft court focused on a number of Microsoft's practices that could
not be justified by any legitimate business reasons.3 First, the court held
33 See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, PreservingMonopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617, 631-34 (1999) (explaining the nature of the Navigator and Java middleware threats to Microsoft).
34See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affg in part and
rev'g in part, and remandingUnited States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C.
2000)). That decision also ruled against the Department on a number of related claims,
such as the government's contention that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act
by attempting to monopolize the browser market and reversed and remanded on Section
1 of the Sherman Act's prohibition on tying as well as the district court's decision to break
up Microsoft into two companies. See 253 F.3d at 46.
35NewYork v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
36In the Microsoft case, the court explained how, in network markets, the lack of application developers for a platform can constitute an "applications barrier to entry." See D.C.
Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 55-56.
37As Franklin Fisher, the government's expert in Microsoft explained, it is important to
be cautious about judging conduct to be exclusionary, and the absence of any plausible
legitimate explanation is an effective means of identifying such conduct. With respect to
the Microsoft case, Fisher suggested that:
The most revealing of the actions (if not the most important), however, was that
involving Internet Content Providers. Microsoft permitted Disney to be featured
by Netscape, but it required that Netscape not be paid for so doing.... Like the
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that the license restrictions imposed by Microsoft excluded Navigator
from the market without any efficiency justification.3 8 Second, the court
held that Microsoft's design decision to place browsing code in the same
files as operating system code and excluding such code from the Add/
Remove Programs utility constituted an exclusionary practice.3 9 Finally,
the court concluded that Microsoft engaged in exclusionary conduct by
pressuring developers to use Microsoft's own non-compatible version of
a Java Virtual Machine (VM), deceiving them about its (lack of) compatibility with Sun's JVM, and pressuring Intel not to support Sun's
JVM 4 1 In so doing, the court underscored that a rival has no duty to
make a competing platform compatible-particularly here where
Microsoft's product worked more effectively on Windows than Sun's
JVM41-but that the use of anticompetitive tactics to gain an advantage
violated the antitrust laws. Nonetheless, where a firm engages in a practice designed to disadvantage a rival-and cannotjustify that practice on
efficiency grounds-it runs afoul of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In reaching its conclusion that Microsoft violated the antitrust laws,
the D.C. Circuit did not seek to define the scope of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act in a manner other than that offered in Aspen Skiing.42 Nor
other acts, its only purpose was the hampering of competition in browsers and
the preservation of the barrier to entry that protected Microsoft's power in operating systems. These were not acts that were profit-maximizing except for that
effect.
Franklin M. Fisher, Economic Analysis and "Bright Line" Tests, 4J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
129, 151 (2008).
38See D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 111 ("[Microsoft's actions] forced OEMs
[original equipment manufacturers like Dell] either to ignore consumer preferences for
Navigator or to give them a Hobson's choice of both browser products at the cost of
increased confusion, degraded system performance, and restricted memory. By ensuring
the Internet Explorer would launch in certain circumstances in Windows 98 even if Navigator were set as the default, and even if the consumer had removed all conspicuous
means of invoking the Internet Explorer, Microsoft created confusion and frustration for
consumers, and increased technical support costs for business customers."); D.C. Circuit
2001, 253 F.3d at 60 (upholding the consumer confusion finding resulting from the preinstallation of Internet Explorer and Microsoft's restrictions on removing it); id. at 61
(restrictions on changing the boot sequence are anticompetitive, as it prevents OEMs
from promoting rivals' browsers).
39D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 64-67. See also Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in
Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordinationin a Networked World 37 (John M.
Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 130, 2001) ("even in the networked world, preinstallation of software might confer a substantial advantage due to reduced transaction
costs."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2791 79.
40D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 74-77.
41Id.

at 74.

Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV.257, 302 ("The claim most subject tojjudicial interpretation in the Microsoft case is
the substantive monopolization claim itself, where the courts have always had difficulty
fashioning an appropriate standard."). At bottom, it may well be the case that imposing a
42
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did it clarify Aspen Skiins somewhat open-ended formulation and declined to set forth a means of "distinguishing between exclusionary acts,
43
which .reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it." It
did, however, reject Microsoft's claim that the Department's failure to
identify consumer harm-as distinct from predatory conduct-should
doom a Section 2 case. In that regard, it endorsed the argument of Professor Franklin Fisher (the government's primary economic expert) that
"[ilnjuries to competition are presumed to injure consumers" and the
government should not have to wait for a predatory campaign to succeed before taking action. 44 Finally, Microsoft both noted and rejected
Microsoft's Schumpeterian argument that a new platform will invariably
displace the dominant platform and thus minimize any worries about
45
temporal exercises of market power.
In many respects, the hardest question in Microsoft was the selection of
the appropriate remedial strategy. The district court originally decided,
in a judgment overturned by the D.C. Circuit, that the company should
be broken into two, with an applications company separated from an

more demanding standard is most appropriate where the law should worry more about
the risks of false acquittals than false convictions. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of
Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the FederalCourts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 369 n.209
(2000) (listing authorities).
43D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 58.
44Franklin M. Fisher, Antitrust and Innovative Industries,32 UWLA L. REv. 83, 83 (2001).
In particular, there are three possible positions as to what Section 2 requires: (1) proof of
harm to consumers; (2) proof that a monopolist has excluded competitors from the market on a basis other than efficiency; or (3) proof of exclusionary conduct towards competition. See D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 58-59. Microsoft rejected the first by holding that,
since the case presented proof of the second, it was sufficient to hold the company liable
under section 2. See id. at 89. Others argue, however, that proof of an anticompetitive
purpose-i.e., the third position-suffices to give rise to antitrust liability, highlighting
that antitrust oversight must be able to address anticompetitive conduct in its incipiency.
SeeJonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7
GEO.MASON L. REv. 495, 503, 506 (1999) (asserting that "liability may be established" in a
Section 2 case "without considering evidence on the effect of the monopolist's conduct
on competition."); David A. Balto & Ernest A. Nagata, Proofof Competitive Effects in Monopolization Cases: A Response to Professor Muris, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 309, 314 (2000) (standard
should be that challenged conduct makes a "significant contribution" to maintaining or
creating monopoly power). For an alternative view, see Nicholas Economides, United
States v. Microsoft: A FailureofAntitrust in the New Economy, 32 UWLA L. REv. 3, 29 (2001)
(terming Fisher's approach as "rush[ing] to judgment before a certainty of an anti-competitive act."); TimothyJ. Muris, The fTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST LJ.
693, 696-97 (2000) (emphasizing the need to assess the actual anticompetitive effect).
4-An alternative Schumpeterian-based argument is that the government's action in
Microsoft sought to facilitate the gales of creative destruction by preventing a dominant
firm from using its market power to prevent the rise of new upstarts using a disruptive
technology. See Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy that Falls Short of Restoring Competition,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 67, 69.
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operating systems company. 46 This approach, which drew inspiration
from the Bell breakup, reflected an odd combination of a limited degree of analysis and considerable ambition. Indeed, the district court
imposed this remedy without holding any hearing to evaluate the relevant costs and benefits. Consequently, the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the court overstepped its bounds, calling for a more careful
47
inquiry into the proper remedial strategy.
The D.C. Circuit's oversight of the remedial issue in Microsoft heeded
both the relevant doctrinal standards and the practical considerations
that should guide the development and institution of an effective remedial strategy. On the doctrinal front, the Supreme Court has counseled
courts that antitrust remedies should end the unlawful conduct, prevent
4
its recurrence, and restore the possibility of competition in the market. 8
Given the breadth of this mandate, courts have considerable latitude in
crafting an appropriate remedy and are not limited to imposing "a simple proscription against the precise conduct [the violator] previously
pursued ... .,,49
On a practical level, as Judge Posner related, courts are
greatly limited by the twin set of concerns that a remedial strategy
should be "sufficiently clear to be judicially administrable" and should
not "impose an undue administrative burden on the district court,
which would have to administer the decree."50 After all, as the Supreme
Court remarked in the Trinko case (quoting Phillip Areeda), courts
should not "assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory
agency." 5'
On remand, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly took these concerns to
heart and emphasized the difficulty of devising a remedy and institutional strategy in light of the dynamic nature of the industry.52 With this
concern in mind, she concluded that the set of conduct remedies
agreed to by the government and Microsoft were reasonable and she
46

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).

47See D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 105-06; see also Howard A. Shelanski &J. Gregory
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 75 (2001).
48 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978).
49Id.at 698.
50 Ken Auletta, Final Offer, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2001, at 43 (quoting Chief Judge
Posner, mediator in the Microsoft case); see also Kenneth G. Elzinga et al., United States v.
Microsoft: Remedy or Malady', 9 GEO. MASON L. Rv.633, 648 (2001) (emphasizing need
to limit oversight costs for court and compliance costs on defendant).
51Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415
(2004) (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilties:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)).
52New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 184 (D.D.C. 2002) (D.D.C. States
Remedy 2002) (analogizing the challenge to "shoe[ing] a galloping horse").
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rejected the calls for more aggressive remedial strategies. She instead
accepted the Justice Department's theory that the appropriate stance
was to address Microsoft's future conduct towards "middleware" platforms.53 She also accepted the federal government's conclusion that any
effort to address the commingling of code would be counterproductive-despite the D.C. Circuit's earlier conclusion that such conduct
4
constituted an antitrust violation by Microsoft.1
In principle, the Microsoft consent decree sought to prevent Microsoft
from engaging in predatory strategies to protect its platform-based dominance. In particular, the decree protected emerging applications developers through a series of requirements imposed on Microsoft, including
one that mandated the reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing of
protocol information (including relevant intellectual property rights) so
that software developers could design applications for non-Microsoft
platforms that could run on Microsoft's operating system as well. It also
imposed requirements to make application programming interfaces
(APIs) available on a non-discriminatory basis.55 The court declined,
however, two remedies suggested by the nofi-settling States-a Java
"must carry" provision and a requirement that the Internet Explorer
product be released under an open source license.5 6 Finally, the court
deemed adequate the definition of interoperability for purposes of the
disclosure requirements and judged as sufficient to enforce -the decree
the establishment of a "three-member 'Technical Committee' of 'experts in software design and programming' . ....7 Ultimately, the district court extended the decree for two years because of an "extreme
and unforeseen delay" in the decree's implementation caused by
Microsoft's failure to produce "complete, accurate, and useable" docu58
mentation on its protocols.
53Id. at 194, affd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft, 373 F.3d 1199, 1223 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (D.C. Circuit 2004).
54D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (concluding that addressing the
commingling of code issue would be very difficult, even if not a "technologically impossible" task). See also D.C. Circuit 2004, 373 F.3d at 1209 ("The district court's decision to
fashion a remedy directed at the effect of Microsoft's commingling, rather than to prohibit commingling, was within its discretion.").
55
D.D.C States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (MSFT Consent Decree § III.D),
required Microsoft to disclose on a non-discriminatory basis the APIs "used by Microsoft
Middleware to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Product." The decree also
called for non-discriminatory disclosure of certain communication protocols. See id. at 269
(§ III.E).
56
1 D.C. Circuit 2004, 373 F.3d at 1227-32.
17 Id. at 1243.
5 New York v. Microsoft Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144 (D.D.C. 2008). The court
emphasized the failure to implement the communications protocol licensing provision
(§ IIL.E). See id. at 158 ("Despite its originally forward-looking nature, no one involved-

2009]

REGULATING INTEROPERABILITY

On the heels of the U.S. antitrust consent decree, the European
Union imposed its own set of requirements on Microsoft, going beyond
those mandated by the U.S. consent decree. In presenting its case, the
European Commission focused on the issues related to competition in
the market for servers and "media players," calling for, among other
things, Microsoft to unbundle its media player from its operating system.5 9 Moreover, the European Commission imposed a fine of 497 million euros-$613 million at that time-that was the largest fine ever
imposed by the Commission. 6° To enforce its remedy, the Commission
called for a monitoring trustee to supervise Microsoft's compliance with
its order.61 The Justice Department assailed this action, calling it at odds
with "sound antitrust policy" and potentially destructive to innovation
and consumer welfare. 62 The European Commission was not dissuaded
by such criticism and proceeded to raise the total fine to $2 billion on
the ground that Microsoft had failed to implement the relevant requirements. On appeal, moreover, the European Court of First Instance upheld the Commission's ruling, emphasizing in its decision the
importance of interoperability to promoting competition in the market
63
for servers.
. It is still too soon to render a definitive judgment on the Microsoft
consent decree, but there is some agreement on a few preliminary observations. As an initial matter, it seems unlikely that the decree, taken
on its own, will enable competitors to displace Microsoft's platform
dominance. 64 At the same time, however, it is also quite possible that the
including the United States-disputes that more than five years after the entry of the
Final Judgments, Section III.E still has yet to be fully implemented."); id. at 163 ("practically speaking, Microsoft has never complied with Section III.E").
59 Case COMP/C-3/37.792-Microsoft Corp., Comm'n Decision, 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23,
at 300 (art. 6) (Mar. 24, 2004) (Commission Decision 2004), available in full at http://ec.
europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf, affd, Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (Ct. First Instance) (CFIDecision 2007).
60 Commission Decision'2004, supra note 59, at 277-78.
61 Id. at 289-91.
62 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, R. Hewitt Pate Issues Statement on the EC's Decision in Its Microsoft Investigation 2 (Mar. 24,
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2004/202976.pdf.
63 To that end, the Court of First Instance quoted the Commission's finding that
"'[w]hen confronted with a choice between putting up with interoperability problems
that render their business processes cumbersome, inefficient and costly, and embracing a
homogeneous Windows solution for their work group network, customers will tend to opt
for the latter proposition' and that '[o]nce they have standardised on Windows, they are
unlikely to report interoperability problems between their client PCs and the work group
servers.'" CIDecision 2007, supra note 59,
662.
64 Some have complained that the ultimate remedial decision, which opted for a set of
behavioral restrictions over structural relief, is to blame on this score. See Bresnahan, supra
note 45, at 67. Even as to a set of behavioral constraints, some have highlighted how those
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decree has given rise to a number of salutary dynamics in terms of providing applications developers with a greater level of transparency and
assurances about the operating environment than they otherwise would
have enjoyed. In this respect, the decree may have curtailed "Microsoft's
ability to use its dominance to impose contractual restraints on various
firms operating in related markets" and thereby promoted a more robust development environment. 6 Although this goal was not necessarily
what motivated the DOJ's decision to bring the Section 2 claims, it may
be a concern that motivated some of the earlier complaints about
Microsoft's conduct. After evaluating this concern at a higher level of
generality in Part II, Part III returns to the specific questions surrounding the impact of the Microsoft decree.
II. OF PLATFORMS, APPLICATIONS, AND
CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS
The dilemmas that Microsoft and AT&T confronted as to how to treat
applications providers underscore a challenge that, under almost any set
of circumstances, will not be easily solved. The basic question is: when
can application developers trust that platform owners will treat them in
a fair, reliable, and forthright fashion? If the answer is "never" or "not
under certain circumstances," there will be increasing pressure on government regulators, antitrust courts, and other institutions to facilitate
cooperation between these two sets of actors.
A.

THE INEXORABLE TENSION BETWEEN PLATFORMS AND APPLICATIONS

The emerging Internet ecosystem provides an array of examples
where platforms and applications must interoperate, raising a series of
challenging issues for policymakers. These issues cut across an array of
domains-all of which can be viewed within a competition policy framework-including antitrust law, intellectual property law, and standard
setting. Consider, for example, the disputes between Nokia and
Qualcomm (over whether Qualcomm has deceived customers and competitors as to the licensing fees it charges for access to patents that are
part of official standards) and the debate whether to mandate access to
the iPod digital music player or the iTunes digital music service by rival
ultimately imposed fell short of what might have been a more effective remedy. See Comments of Computer and Communications Industry Association on the Revised Proposed
Final Judgment at 71-72, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-tuncom/major/mtc-0003061Ob.pdf

(comparing the final negotiated decree to the draft remedies proposed under Judge Posner's mediation).
65
Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 593,
666 (2007).
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digital music services or digital music players. 66 In both cases, a platform
firm possesses either intellectual property or a distribution network (or
both) that can determine the success of an application. Most platform
owners, however, also depend on attracting applications that will make
the platform more valuable and desirable to consumers. Reflecting the
significance of these issues, the often-contentious platform owner-applications developer relationship has generated a cottage industry in business and policy circles, giving rise to concepts like "co-opetition" and
67
'
"network economics.
The reason that these relationships attract such attention in both business and policy circles is that a platform owner often makes substantial
front-end investments that lead to high fixed costs, low marginal costs,
and high entry barriers. In many cases, therefore, the successful platform owner possesses a degree of market power and applications developers depend on the platform owner to facilitate interoperability. As a
practical matter, moreover, the applications developer will invest heavily
in platform-dependent resources, potentially leaving it at the mercy of
the platform provider's continued cooperation and in fear that the platform provider "will raise the price of access [to the network/platform]
to a level that extracts almost all the value from the total enterprise and
leaves the dependent [applications developer] with only crumbs." 61 The
platform provider, by contrast, lives in fear that, once having invested
the necessary resources to establish its product, it will fail to establish a
critical mass of users, will be overtaken by a superior technology, or will
be subject to regulatory oversight that will limit its back-end cost
recovery.

66 For a discussion of the Nokia/Qualcomm dispute, see Nokia, Qualcomm Seek Common
Ground in Legal Fights, ZDNET NEWS, Feb. 14, 2008, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_226230559.html. For a discussion of a recent iPod/iTunes antitrust lawsuit, see Thomas
Claburn, Antitrust Lawsuit ChargesApple with Monopolizing Online Music, INFORMATIONWEEK,

Jan. 3, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/personal_tech/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=205207895. For a discussion of French law allowing consumers to convert
iTunes content to other digital formats, see French iTunes Law Goes Into Effect, USATODAY,
Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2006-O8-03-iPod_
x.htm.
7
6 ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRYJ. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 4-5 (1996); SHAPIRO &
VARIAN, supra note 12, at 173-75.
68

James V. DeLong, Avoiding a Tech Train Wreck,

THE AMERicAN,

May/Jun. 2008,

http://www.american.com/archive/2008/may-june-magazine-contents/avoiding-a-techtrain-wreck. See also Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and
Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidencefrom Intel, 16J. ECON. & MGMrT.

STRATEGY

1, 1

(2007) (noting that, in platform markets, platform providers "may have considerable influence over the livelihood of developers of complementary products, and the behavior of
platform owners toward the other firms in the ecosystem has been subject to much
scrutiny").
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Relationships between platform providers and application developers
can be less interdependent and subject to easier exit in a world of open
standards where interoperability across platforms provide both sellers
and customers considerable flexibility. In theory, such an ecosystem promotes innovation because the owners of technology platforms "work together more easily, with less hassle, and ensure [] that they have more
choice[s] when they are making a decision about what to buy or to
use." 69 In practice, however, this conception neither describes most
cases nor is ideal in all cases insofar as some level of "stickiness" in and
loyalty to a proprietary platform is sometimes necessary to promote investment and enable ongoing platform innovation. Indeed, it is the
open and nonproprietary nature of the TCP/IP suite of protocolswhich enable the Internet to operate and function in the manner depicted above-that has made it difficult to upgrade this technology. 0 In
some cases, the constraints associated with open standards are well
worth the cost, but the difficult tradeoffs involved make categorical
judgments imprudent and have prevented the emergence of a "coher71
ent legal approach to interoperability."
Given the widespread existence of and likely continued dominance of
proprietary platforms, whether such platforms will face built-in incentives to behave in a fair-minded fashion is a question that merits further
study. Consider, for example, that many platform sponsors can manage
effectively the tension between creating "economic incentives that encourage other firms to develop complementary applications for the platform, and at the same time protect[ing] its own ability to profit from its
innovations." 72 Even where a platform monopolist possesses the opportunity to engage in strategic behavior that destroys competition in the
applications market-say, threatening firms with foreclosure if they fail
to sell out on the cheap-such tactics may well be anticipated and addressed through contractual protections. 7 Indeed, the failure to appreciate that firms routinely take steps to protect themselves against the
possibility of ex post strategic behavior is a weakness in the logic of the

69Urs Gasser & John G. Palfrey, BreakingDown Digital Barriers:When and How ICT Interoperability Drive Innovation I (Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007-8, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1033226.
70 See D.C. Feldmeier et al., Protocol Boosters, 16 IEEE JSAC 437, 437-38 (Apr. 1998),
available at http://www.cis.upenn.edu/-jms/papers/jsac.pdf.
71Gasser & Palfrey, supra note 69, at 11.
7 Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, Strategiesfor Being a Platform Leader, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at R6.
73
As Gawer and Henderson note, "if the entrant monopolist's incentive to engage in ex
post price 'squeezes' is sufficiently strong, complementors may have no ex ante incentive to
engage in innovation at all." Gawer & Henderson, supra note 68, at 5.
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Supreme Court's Kodak decision, which adopted a relatively categorical
approach to addressing "ex post opportunism. 7 4 Complicating matters is
the fact that the type of behavior that can be classed as "opportunistic"
or "strategic" varies and can, in theory, be prevented through contractual safeguards. Such safeguards, however, are difficult to craft in many
cases, as they must protect investments made "under conditions of great
uncertainty, and it is difficult to write the contracts that would be
required."75
B.

THE CREDIBLE COMMITMENT PROBLEM AND THE COMPETITION
POLICY STAKES

The challenge for platform owners is to assure applications developers that they will continue to treat such entities in a benign fashion, even
when the platform owner attains substantial market power and has the
ability to undermine the position of the applications developer. Although platform owners face powerful incentives to assure applications
developers that they will be treated fairly, 76 there are notable cases
where the incentives of the platform owner cut in a different direction.
Many applications developers, therefore, may not want to merely rely on
the continued goodwill of the platform owners on which they depend.
Indeed, the notable success of open source development can be understood, in part, as a reflection of its favorable development environment
(i.e., where continued interoperability is relatively assured and the possibility of development fees being imposed is close to nil).77 In other contexts, companies have sought to develop a trusted reputation for fair
dealing (which would be lost if they engaged in opportunistic behavior)
or to provide some means of assuring developers that they will not engage in harmful conduct-such as the metaphorical version of "trading
hostages," whereby each firm holds something of value to the other so
74See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). For an
argument that the issues in that case can be understood as, at worst, the exploitation of
unsophisticated customers (and not harm to competition), see Benjamin Klein, Market

Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 47-50 (1993).
7 DeLong, supra note 68. As DeLong explained on this point, "A significant problem
with the mantra of 'do it by contract' is that it requires contract writers with an unlimited
legal budget and a level of foresight that would be the envy of a psychic." Id.; see also Paul
L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
95, 102 (2002) ("Transacting parties enter into relationships to mitigate [ex post opportunistic behavior,] but cannot do so perfectly.").
76 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 23, at 97-105.
77One risk in that context, however, is that patent holders will sue users or developers
of open source products. See Paul H. Arne, PatentRisks in Open Source Licensing, in PRAc. L.
INST., ADVANCED
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that neither engages in opportunistic behavior at the other's expense.78
Even where companies develop such strategies, there is still some margin for error, miscalculation, and mistrust-a lesson that Intel, despite
its efforts to promote trust in its business practices,7 9 has learned (and
re-learned) when it faced repeated antitrust investigations. 0
Because of the high stakes involved with platform owner-application
developer relationships, the government will often be asked to oversee
the terms of such dealing between them. First, the affected parties themselves may view government oversight-through regulation or antitrust-as a means of "leveling the playing field" or gaining through
regulation or litigation what they could not gain in negotiation. Second,
even if not viewed as a "rent-seeking" exercise, firms and individuals may
wish to avoid the institutional instability and the lack of transparency
which may attend private arrangements established by platform providers. The development of common carrier rules by common law courts
and the later use of those rules as guides for administrative regulation,
for example, reflected the unease that those reliant on physical infrastructure provided by private carriers (like the railroads) were left exposed to an undue risk of opportunistic behavior. With respect to the
critical software, hardware, and transport platforms that support the Internet, some predict that "some form of government intervention, to set
the rules, is inevitable" and may "be welcomed by the players, just as
government intervention was welcomed in the end by the railroads."'
Whether and how such rules are developed, however, remains to be
seen, and policymakers should be mindful of the institutional challenges in developing any oversight regime for such a dynamic industry.8 2

78 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: UsingHostages to Support Exchange,
73 Am. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1983).
79
For a discussion of Intel's effort to support interoperability, see ANNABELLE GAWER &
MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: How INTEL, MICROSOFT,AND Cisco DRIVE
INDUSTRY INNOVATION 57-62 (2002).

80For an example of its antitrust issues, see Intel Corp., Complaint, FFC Docket No.
9288 (Jun. 8, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/06/intelcmp.pdf; see also
Stephen Labaton, In Turnabout, Antitrust Unit Looks at Intel N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 7, 2008, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/O7/technology/07chip.html.
s1 Andrew Odlyzko, Network Neutrality, Search Neutrality, and the Never-Ending Conflict Between Efficiency and Fairness in Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 40, 52 (2009), available at
http://www.mejournal.com/artman2/uploads/1/odlyzko_- RNEmarO9.pdf.
82 Id. ("Society needs basic rules to operate by, and modern technology creates potenial scenarios that old rules did not cover. But we need to remember that it is not easy to
regulate markets, especially ones in cyberspace, and especially when policy makers labor
under the burden of many false myths."); DeLong, supra note 68 (noting the unfortunate
trend that "policy tends to lurch back and forth, favoring now one group and then the
other, to the long-term detriment of both, and of the public").
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The third and most compelling rationale for government oversight of
platform provider-applications developer relationships rests on the conviction that independent innovation of applications that ride on a platform yields considerable social benefits and should be protected from
opportunistic behavior. If platform owners are able to appropriate the
entire value of all inventions that rely on their platform, they are likely
to deter considerable amounts of innovation and wealth creation. It is
clear, moreover, that the platform providers themselves will not be able
to foresee or invent all of the technological breakthroughs that rely on
their platforms.8 3 This concern only becomes relevant, however, if there
are scenarios in which the interests of the platform providers diverge
from those of application developers seeking to innovate (and thus society's interest in promoting innovation and consumer welfare). 84 Such
scenarios are quite plausible because the development of new applications can undermine the position of the incumbent platform provider
(for example, by facilitating competition in the platform market itself or
undermining the ability of the platform provider to engage in price discrimination).85 By seeking to prevent such a scenario, platform owners
83The examples of unforeseeable inventions are legion, starting with the fact that "The
railroads enabled the great catalog mail order businesses that transformed rural America,
but they did not invent them." DeLong, supra note 68. With respect to the Internet, the
Center for Democracy & Technology elaborated on this point:
The history of the Internet has been marked by numerous examples of new
technologies-such as instant messaging or web-based video-that emerge from
humble beginnings but then become extremely popular. The "next big thing"
might never have a chance to develop and become popular if the approval and
cooperation of several top broadband access providers were to become a prerequisite to widespread use. The pace of innovation that has been the hallmark of
the Internet could slow substantially.
Reply Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology to the Notice of Inquiry in
Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (July 16, 2007), available at http://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=6519558029.
See also C. Scott Hemphill, Network Neutrality and The False Promise of Zero-PriceRegulation, 25
YALEJ. ON REG. 135, 177-79 (2008) (addressing value of network neutrality regulation to
peer production).
84As Shane Greenstein explained in this regard, "[p ] articularly worrisome are situations where carriers take actions that are privately beneficial-either to protect existing
markets or related commercial investments and relationships-and have the consequence
of reducing the incentives of other firms to conduct economics experiments that could
create value." Shane Greenstein, Economic Experiments and Neutrality in Internet Access 40
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13158, 2007), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w13158.
85See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 23, at 107-09; F.M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible

Capitalism, 30J. ECON.
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1416, 1418 (1992) (arguing that innovation "under-

mine [s] the market positions of firms committed to old ways of doing business."); Willow
A. Sheremata, Barriersto Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BUu. 937, 944 (1997) ("When owners of a current technology raise
artificial barriers to entry of new technology, opportunities for innovation decline to the
detriment of consumers.").
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might act in ways that reduce socially valuable experimentation and
innovation. 86
Cautioning against the case for government oversight of the relations
between platforms and applications is the difficulty of overseeing the
terms of dealing in a technologically dynamic context. The AT&T consent decree is an instructive precedent that highlights the institutional
challenges that face antitrust courts. That case involved a relatively stable industry in which it was not necessary to constantly revisit the terms
of dealing and where the presence of a regulatory agency offered an
alternative means of engaging in the necessary oversight of the platform. In the Microsoft case, by contrast, neither of those two factors was
present. Consequently, as antitrust courts and enforcers look to those
two cases for guidance in terms of overseeing the relationship between
platforms and applications, they should draw the right lessons and,
more importantly, ask the right questions. Part III proceeds to highlight
those consideration and questions, calling for a more nuanced evaluation of what institutional strategies competition policy can call upon to
oversee the terms of dealing between platform owners and application
developers.
III. LESSONS FOR MONOPOLIZATION REMEDIES GEARED
TOWARD INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES
The information economy and endemic challenges related to cooperation between competitors in network industries is likely to strain the
capabilities of antitrust courts. Disputes related to interoperability, particularly in the absence of any regulatory authority charged with overseeing the Internet and the information industries more generally (with
the exception of telecommunications networks), will increasingly reach
antitrust courts and enforcement agencies. After all, applications developers often fear the possibility of exclusionary conduct by a platform
monopoly and are likely to complain of the sort of strategic behavior
challenged in the AT&T and Microsoft cases. As the failed attempt to
impose an AT&T-like divestiture requirement on Microsoft underscores, however, "[o]pportunities for effective, yet relatively simple,
86 See Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards,Innovation, and Essential Facilities:Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY:
TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST IssuEs 193, 207 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001)
("[I]
nnovation normally proceeds fastest when a large number of distinct participants are
trying multiple approaches simultaneously."); Shane Greenstein, The Three Coms of the
Microsoft Antitrust Suit: Competition Policy, Commercial Experimentation, and Computing Platforms, 32 UWLA L. Rev. 95, 100 (2001) (noting how experimentation and innovation
requires multiple points of entry).
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structural relief may be rare ... ."87 Consequently, it is incumbent on
enforcers and courts to utilize increased creativity as to what institutional strategies can enable behavioral remedies to succeed.
Courts and enforcement agencies will often look for solutions to enable platforms and applications to interoperate effectively. In so doing,
they may well invoke the theory noted by Senator Hatch as to the
Microsoft case: "Vigilant and effective antitrust enforcement today is preferable to the heavy hand of government regulation of the Internet tomorrow."s This motivation begs the difficult institutional question of
"but how?" This Part addresses that very issue. Section A discusses a few
key lessons from antitrust doctrine; Section B evaluates how standard
setting bodies can help to develop and enforce commitments to
interoperability.
A.

LESSONS FROM ANTITRUST DOCTRINE AND HISTORY

Institutional considerations have long guided antitrustjurisprudence.
In the 1960s, former antitrust chief Donald Turner explained that the
antitrust laws should not attempt to regulate parallel pricing by oligopolists because there is no manageable remedy to address such conduct. 89 For similar reasons, courts generally eschew calls for them to
regulate the rates of a business or limit the rents charged on a license of
a patented good.90 A notable exception, of course, is the AT&T case,
87GregoryJ. Werden, Remedies for Exclusionary Conduct Should Protect and Preservethe Competitive Process, supra this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 65, 71 (2009). See a/soJoskow, supra note
75, at 114 ("divestiture remedies should be used very cautiously and only in conjunction
with careful analysis").
S8 John R. Wilke & David Bank, Sen. Hatch Issues WarningMicrosoft May Be Building Proprietary Internet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1998, at B15. In a variation on this theme, the Sixth
Circuit has counseled that antitrust courts "must be careful not to abdicate their responsibilities under the Antitrust laws in the name of expedience. When the adverse effect of
allowing a monopolist to maintain certain practices is clear, a court should stay its hand
rarely, if ever." Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864 n.57 (6th Cir. 1979).
89Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669-73 (1962).
90See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 n.l
(9th Cir. 1997) (reversing lower court injunction requiring Kodak to provide parts to
Independent Service Operators, including copyrighted and patented materials, at "reasonable prices."); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65
F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he antitrust laws are not a price-control statute or a
public-utility or common-carrier rate-regulation statute."); 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
720b (3d ed. 2008) (antitrust courts generally avoid direct price regulation

because "judicial tribunals lack both the expertise and the narrow jurisdictional focus
necessary to make such regulatory schemes work at all."); Town of Concord v. Boston
Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1990).
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where the oversight of the equal access rules fell within the purview of a
regulatory agency.
As explained above, the relevant antitrust standards on the choice of
remedy provide little guidance to courts evaluating complex institutional considerations. The Supreme Court, for example, has offered
broad and generally unhelpful guidance along the lines of the directive
that the appropriate remedies should "unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct"9' and "terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation, and ensure that there remain
no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future."92 Fortunately, there is some valuable guidance, albeit often underappreciated,
that can be gleaned from substantive monopolization law.
Despite all of the scholarly criticism of the Aspen Skiing case, the case's
substantive standards, although not explicitly focused on remedial concerns, provide three important limiting principles that provide valuable
institutional perspectives on how courts can identify and address antitrust violations. First, the substantive monopolization requirements
greatly narrow the range of scenarios that warrant judicial attention. In
particular, courts must determine that a platform owner enjoys durable
monopoly power before considering whether any exclusionary conduct
raises a duty to deal claim. 93 Even if such a showing is made, a party
seeking to establish a mandated duty to deal must demonstrate that any
proffered plausible business justification for the challenged practice is
pretextual.94 Before mandating access arrangements under a duty to
deal framework, antitrust law considers whether so doing would be infeasible or harmful in any manner. 95 In so doing, antitrust law evaluates
91Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577 (1972).
92 United

States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968).

93See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEo L.J. 271, 275 (1987) ("the struc-

tural preconditions-mainly high concentration coupled with severe hurdles to entrynecessary for support of exclusionary or other anticompetitive effects now are meticulously respected" before Section 2 claims can go forward).
94In Aspen Skiing itself, the reasons offered for the defendant's conduct, particularly its
refusal to accept coupons provided by Aspen Highlands that enabled skiers to use its
mountains, were rejected by the Supreme Court. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
95 Importantly, preventing the loss of customers, assuring consistent profits, or promoting a company's vision of the public interest do not constitute efficiency defenses cognizable by antitrust courts. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380-82
(1973). In a questionable ruling, however, two circuit courts judged AT&T's assessment of
the public interest-as opposed to any regulatory action-as sufficient to immunize the
company from an interconnection requirement. See S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T, 740
F.2d 980, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mid-Texas Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372,
1390 (5th Cir. 1980).
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whether imposing an access requirement would be unsafe, unreliable,
or would degrade the quality of the relevant good or service.
The second critical consideration set forth in Aspen Skiing, at least as
conceived of by the Trinko decision, is that a viable duty to deal claim
must rest on a prior course of dealing or some benchmark that can provide a tractable guide as to what constitutes a reasonable type of behavior.96 In particular, Trinko suggested that the facts involved in that casean allegation of discriminatory interconnection arrangements between
the dominant local telephone provider and its would-be rivals-were
fundamentally different from those in Aspen Skiing. The Trinko Court
emphasized that the allegations in Aspen Skiing were far more tractable
because they involved a case of outright denial-as opposed to discriminatory access-of a "product that [the defendant] already sold at retail-to oversimplify slightly, lift tickets representing a bundle of services
to skiers." 97 Even if the type of access requested in Trinko was less exceptional than suggested by the Court (and even if the Court unfairly characterized the question presented in Otter TaiP), Trinko correctly
highlights the importance of a reliable benchmark in determining
whether a refusal to deal can judged as a predatory strategy and rectified
effectively through antitrust oversight. Notably, the Aspen Skiing Court
rejected the defendant's argument that the case required the Court to
enter the thicket of evaluating the appropriate division of revenue between competitors engaged in a cooperative venture by invoking the
earlier (and discontinued) approach of using random-sample surveys to
allocate usage between a multi-mountain ticket.9 9 Alternatively, the
Aspen Skiing Court could have rejected the defendant's argument on the
96 The Court also expressed a relative confidence-overconfidence, in my view-that a
regulatory agency's jurisdiction undermines the case for antitrust oversight. See Philip J.
Weiser, The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatoy Era, 50 ANTITRUST BULL.
549, 561 (2005).
97
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410
(2004). See also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610 (refusal to accept coupons, which would have
provided "immediate benefits," could not be justified as a legitimate business practice).
98 Trinko distinguished the facts of Otter Tail by suggesting that "the defendant was already in the business of providing a service to certain customers (power transmission over
its network), and refused to provide the same service to certain other customers." Trinko,
540 U.S. at 410. This reasoning, however, overlooks that Otter Tail itself focused more on
the fact that "[t]here were no engineering factors that prevented Otter Tail from selling
power at wholesale to those towns that wanted municipal plants or wheeling the [requested] power." Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 378. As noted above, the relevant oversight remedy in Otter Tail--a mandate that the defendant wheel power to the plaintiff at wholesale
rates-resembled that of the AT&T case because it could be overseen by a.regulatory
agency (the Federal Power Commission) and not the antitrust court.
99Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 609. See also Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REv. 783, 816 (2007) (developing this
point).
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ground that a proper injunction merely would have required the defendant to accept the coupons offered by the plaintiff to pay face value for
the use of its facility.
Third, where courts must intervene by crafting a conduct remedy,
Aspen Skiing underscores the basic antitrust lesson that courts should
search for appropriate standards that can be judicially enforced. One
strategy, as noted by Aspen Skiing, is that the presence of market
benchmarks can provide a workable remedial scheme and ensure that
the court will not be forced to interpret and micromanage regulatory
mandates. 00 As discussed in connection with Microsoft, the transparency
and non-discrimination requirements in that context provide applications developers (including potential competitors) with valuable assurances that they are not going to be subject to opportunistic behavior.
Although some have criticized such remedial requirements as ineffectual, such criticisms often fail to acknowledge fully the difficulty of judicial supervision of remedies for which courts are not institutionally well
situated to enforce.' 0'
The challenge for antitrust law and competition policy more generally
is whether relatively modest conduct remedies will be sufficient to forestall either full-blown regulation or structural relief. In the case of
AT&T, the ability of such remedies to work effectively was called into
question to such a degree that the court viewed a radical restructuring
of the company as a sound strategy-ironically, just when the notice and
transparent interconnection requirements were put into place by the
100See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 1224-28
(9th Cir. 1997) (imposing duty to license parts to competitors on same terms as sold to
other customers); Carlton, supranote 4, at 675 n.30 (suggesting that, where a benchmark
exists for a discriminatory access arrangement between a vendor and different customers
that is designed to and has the effect of undermining competition in a related market,
antitrust scrutiny should attach).
101Carl Shapiro's judgment, for example, is that:
Looking back after six years, the Final Judgment has achieved precisely what it
was designed to do: prevent Microsoft from continuing to engage in the conduct
that had been found to be illegal. The Final Judgment has done nothing significant to affirmatively restore competition. Thus, in my view, the remedy in the
most prominent antitrust case of our era has failed.
Carl Shapiro, Microsoft: A Remedial Failure,75 ANTITRUST L.J. 739, 761 (2009). Notably, in
bemoaning the court's refusal to mandate that Internet Explore be made available on an
open source basis and that Microsoft be required to auction off the right to port
Microsoft Office, Shapiro declined to evaluate how the court could oversee such requirements effectively. Id. at 757-58. This very concern is presumably what Dennis Carlton,
who, like Shapiro, was an expert economist in the antitrust litigation against Microsoft,
had in mind when he reported that "[riemedies for anticompetitive exclusionary conduct
can be hard to fashion, as the Microsoft case illustrates." Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust
Need to Be Modernized? (Econ. Analysis Group, Discussion Paper No. 07-3, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=956930.
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FCC. In Microsoft, by contrast, the case for more radical regulatory oversight or structural relief was far from clear. Rather, the court decided, in
the words of Professor Spencer Weber Waller, that "disclosure is divestiture when it comes to our high-tech, information-based, intellectual
10 2
property-driven economy."
Whether or not the Microsoft consent decree aided the rise of Google
in any respect (whether by the terms of the decree or its deterrent effect), the decree may well have influenced Microsoft's behavior for the
better. 0 3 Consider, for example, that developers have long expressed
concerns about so-called "secret AiPIs" and favoritism for some applications developers over others. 0 4 As a result of the decree, Microsoft can
now more credibly dispel such concerns, highlighting that if it hid secret
APIs from some outside developers, it would be in contempt of court.
The fact that the consent decree bolsters the credibility of Microsoft's
commitment to support interoperability thus may well explain why
Microsoft itself was willing to embrace this requirement. 0 5 Moreover,
from an enforceability perspective, the fact that the requirement is to
make APIs available on a non-discriminatory basis, it is less onerous to
enforce than one devised out of whole cloth. 10 6 By contrast, the more
ambitious protocol licensing requirement is open to criticism on the
102 Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, supra
this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 26, (2009) (emphasis omitted). It also merits noting that,
contrary to Shapiro's suggestion, see supra note 101, the remedies addressing the identical anticompetitive tactics used in the first browser war may well not be irrelevant. See, e.g.,
Ed Felten, The Microsoft Case: The Government's Theory, in Hindsight, FREEDOM TO TINKER,
May 27, 2008, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1294 ("Life doesn't always offer doovers, but we may get a do-over on the browser war, and this time it looks like Microsoft
will take the high road.").
103Ed Felten, for example, has suggested that the case should be considered a success
"not so much because of the settlement, which most people saw as weak, but because the
case taught Microsoft that ignoring antitrust concerns can be dangerous..." and because
"its business and legal behavior is more moderate." Ed Felten, The Microsoft Case, Ten
Years Later, FREEDOM TO TINKER, May 20, 2008, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=
1292.
104 See Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations or Missed
Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1042, 1078-79 (2001).
105See Transcript of Teleconference with Bill Neukom, Executive VP for Law and Corporate Affairs, Microsoft, on Microsoft's Proposed Final Judgment, at 3 (5/10/00) available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f219300/219360.pdf (referring to Microsoft proposal
calling for API disclosure as "codify[ing]" company's practice); Microsoft Corporation's
Proposed Final Judgment at 3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. May
10, 2000), available at 2000 WL 572716 (requiring Microsoft to provide "timely and complete access to such Technical Information as is provided through any software development program that Microsoft makes available as to the software development community
at large").
106See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1999); see
also Declaration of Carl Shapiro at §IV(B) (3), United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 981232 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f219100/
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ground that it is both more costly than a non-discriminatory API requirement and less likely to succeed. 10 7 Nonetheless, some commentators have suggested-particularly as to the requirements imposed by the
European Union-that such requirements have affected Microsoft's
conduct and may well have facilitated the ability of open source prod108
ucts to compete with Microsoft.
In a sign that the decree may be facilitating a changing perspective on
the part of Microsoft, the company has advanced, in two recent initiatives, its own commitment to transparency and openness. The first such
effort, deemed the "Windows Principles," was announced in 2006.109
The second such effort, the adoption of a set of Interoperability Principles in 2008, suggests an even stronger commitment to and embrace of
interoperability.'10 In addition to these initiatives, Microsoft has invested
in a support staff to comply with the decree's requirements, increasing
the number of staff persons from 10 in 2003 to 630 by January 2008.111
In Europe, antitrust enforcers were initially unimpressed with such
steps, with European Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes suggesting that "talk is cheap" and other high level officials reporting that
they were skeptical as to the sincerity and likely effectiveness of
Microsoft's commitment to interoperability." 2 More recently, however,
the European Union has concluded that Microsoft has made substantial

219127.pdf (arguing that since Microsoft already makes access to its APIs available,
"mandatory disclosure of APIs should not impose any significant burden on Microsoft.").
107This is the line of criticism advanced by William Page and Seldon J. Childers. See
William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons
from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications ProtocolLicensing Requirement, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 127-29 (2007) (arguing, among other things, that few
firms have become licensees under the program, and fewer still have developed products
that rely on the protocols); William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compliance
with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case, supra this issue, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (2009) (highlighting that the protocol licensing provision of the consent
decree does not follow the model of relying on requirements that are enforceable vis-zi-vis
a reliable benchmark).
10sSee Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Samba Gets Inside Look at Microsoft Specs, CNET
NEWs.coM, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-13580_3-9836784-39.html?part=
dtx&tag=nl.e433.
109See Microsoft, Windows Principles: Empowering Choice, Opportunity, and Interoperability, http://www.microsoft.com/About/CorporateCitizenship/US/Promotinglnnovation/WindowsPrinciples.mspx.
110See Microsoft, Interoperability Principles: Open Connections, Standards Support,
Data Portability, http://www.microsoft.com/interop/principles/default.mspx.
"I New York v. Microsoft Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 141, 161-62 (D.D.C. 2008).
11 Dawn Kawamoto, European Antitrust Chief Is No Shrinking Violet, CNETNEws.cOM, Feb.
27, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9881411-7.htmi.
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progress in supporting interoperability and has determined
that the
3
presence of an oversight monitor was no longer necessary."
B.

STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF

-INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT

To the extent that any oversight regime will be effective in facilitating
interoperability, antitrust courts and competition policy more generally
need to investigate the challenges associated with institution building
and norm creation. Like Madison's concern with mere "parchment barriers,"" 4 the best remedial strategies call for some degree of self-enforcement and built-in checking mechanisms to operate effectively. Of late,
this concern has pointed antitrust enforcers towards a greater degree of
concern with and oversight of standard-setting bodies. Given that the
emerging knowledge-based economy places such a huge premium on
inter- and intra-industry cooperation and interoperability, this concern
is warranted because such institutions have the potential to play a valuable competition policy role-both in preventing the need for antitrustmandated interoperability and, potentially, in facilitating it. To that end,
antitrust law will need to develop a strategy for empowering and overseeing the operation of such institutions.
The first challenge for antitrust enforcers is to develop a productive
relationship with standard-setting forums. This requires antitrust authorities around the world to understand the governance of such bodies.
Three notable governance issues that antitrust authorities must come to
grips with are the development of safeguards to prevent cartel-like behavior (be it price setting or the exclusion of rivals), the creation of
processes for open and fair decision making, and the determination of
what restrictions are placed on the inclusion of patented technology in
official standards. Antitrust enforcers will generally do well to allow
some level of experimentation across different standard-setting bodies
and not insist on "one size fits all" solutions to these issues." 5 In a sign
that the U.S. Supreme Court may appreciate this point, CaliforniaDental
Association v. FTC suggests a great level of respect for and deference to
such entities," 6 and can be best read as announcing the principle that
113 John Fontana, EU Loosens Microsoft Monitoring Requirement, NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 5,
2009), available at http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/030509-microsoft-eu.html.
"4 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 305 James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
"5 For a developed version of this argument, see PhilipJ. Weiser, Making the World Safe
for Standard Setting 30-32 (U. Colorado L. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Working
Paper No. 08-06, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1003432.
116 See California Dental Ass'n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1999). In my view, the
court probably overdid the necessary level of deference in that case, as exemplified by its
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credible standard-setting bodies are to be regarded-at least in the absence of contrary evidence-as acting in the public interest, not in the
117
self-interest of any or all of its members.
A second challenge for antitrust enforcers is to determine when the
conduct of standard-setting participants crosses the line and violates the
antitrust laws. The highest profile antitrust case of this type involved
Rambus. In that case, Rambus attracted the attention of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) for deceiving the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), an industry standard-setting body, about its
patent position. In particular, the FTC alleged that Rambus violated the
antitrust laws by "deliberately engaging in a pattern of anticompetitive
acts and practices that served to deceive IJEDEC], resulting in adverse
'
effects on competition and consumers."118
After the FTC concluded that
Rambus violated the antitrust laws by engaging in deceptive conduct
during the setting of an official standard (and being able to charge
higher royalties as a result), it concluded that the appropriate remedy
was to restrict the royalty payments to Rambus to the level that would
have been allowed under the standard-setting body's reasonable and
own judgment thatJustice Breyer's reasoning-had it been offered by the Ninth Circuitmight well have warranted a different result. See id. at 779 ("Had the Court of Appeals
engaged in a painstaking discussion in a league with Justice [Breyer's] (compare his 14
pages with the Ninth Circuit's 8), and had it confronted the comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable advertising, its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its
conclusion."); see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A ProposedAntitrust Approach to Collaborations
Among Competitors,86 IowA L. Rhv. 1137, 1161-62 (2001) (criticizing decision and quoting
appraisals of decision as an "enigma" and "cr[ying] out for more clarification").
117 See CaliforniaDental,526 U.S. at 771, 773 n.10 ("The public service aspect, and other
features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly
be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.")
(quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1975)). To be sure,
this reading departs some from the Court's perspective in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), but it echoes the approach of the Third
Circuit in United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1993), where it
called for relaxed scrutiny of organizations acting for public interest reasons. See also
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 487 (1st Cir. 1988) (legitimate
standard setting to be given deference). For suggestions that the Court's decision can be
so understood, see Wayne D. Collins, California Dental Association and the Futureof Rule of
Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Fall 1999, at 58 (suggesting this to be a key difference between
the majority and the dissent). See also David Balto, Some Observations on California Dental
Association v. FTC, ANTIrRUST, Fall 1999, at 64 ("the decision is limited to the specific
context of self-regulation of advertising by an association of professionals."). Under this
reading, a key threshold showing necessary to challenge a standard-setting body's decision is a demonstration how its decision reflected a private party's (or parties') effort to
exclude competition. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988) (undertaking such an inquiry); see also Clamp-All 851 F.2d at 487 (rejecting antitrust claim on the grounds of no antitrust injury where competitor failed to present evidence of anticompetitive intent).
118Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Initial Decision Released in Rambus -Case (Feb.
24, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/rambttsid.shtn.
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non-discriminatory license requirement. 19 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
ruled that this conduct did not fall within the scope of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, highlighting that it did not have the effect of excluding
rivals from the marketplace, but merely enabling it to charge a higher
price. 20 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit split with the Third Circuit, which
ruled at the motion to dismiss stage that Qualcomm's alleged breach of
its promise to adhere to a reasonable and non-discriminatory requirement constituted a violation of the antitrust laws. 12 1 This circuit split,
along with the unique facts of Rambus (including a disclosure requirement that was flawed at best), underscore that litigation over "patent
hold-up" behavior is likely to continue and that standard-setting bodies
should evaluate carefully their own strategies for avoiding such conduct
22
in the first place.
With respect to Microsoft, European regulators have viewed with interest and suspicion Microsoft's conduct in key standard-setting efforts,
suggesting a new form of an antitrust violation in the context of standard setting. In the winter of 2008, the European Union announced
that it had opened an antitrust investigation focused on how the company participates in and influences the decision making of entities, such
as the European Committee for Standardization or the International
Organization for Standardization. 21 In the face of this pressure, the
company's commitment to interoperability, or both, Microsoft announced that it would support an open source standard known as
OpenDocument (ODF) and not merely its own proprietary product
OOXML. 124 It remains to be seen, however, whether this decision will

end this investigation or whether the European Union will push for
119See Final Order, Rambus Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302, 2007 WL 431522 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205finalorder.pdf; see also Opinion of the
Commission on Remedy, Rambus Inc., , FTC Docket No. 9302, slip op. at 22-23 (2007),
available at http://www2.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf.
120Rambus, Inc. v. FrC, 522 F.3d 456, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1318 (2009).
121See id. at 466 (acknowledging conflict with Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d
297 (3d Cir. 2007)).
122 I develop this point in Weiser, supra note 115, at 19-21. See also Daniel A. Crane,
Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination 26 (Cardozo
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 232, 2008) (forthcoming in WORUNG WITHIN THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds.)), available al
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1120071
("[E]ven a precise and
well explained definition of the RAND commitment will be next to worthless unless the
institutional apparatus for its implementation is properly structured.").
123Associated Press, EU Analyzes Microsoft's Promise to Support Rival Open Document
Format, May 22, 2008, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/Wire/20818/?nlid=
1093&a=F.
124Id.
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some form of an enforceable commitment to an ongoing level of support for the ODF standard. In any event, the EU's push in this area
moves in a potentially dangerous direction in the sense that the type of
conduct being addressed-vote trading and influence peddling-is far
from unheard of in standard-setting efforts. Regulators should be wary
about adopting rules that limit such behavior because such rules may
well give rise to unintended consequences and might undermine the
effectiveness of such bodies-in which some form of give-and-take
agreements may be necessary for them to develop successful standards.
The final issue is whether standard-setting bodies can be used as a
means to implement interoperability requirements set forth in an antitrust consent decree. To that end, some suggested that the Microsoft consent decree should have embodied a commitment on the part of
Microsoft to support open industry standards on an equal basis to its
own proprietary technologies.'25 The objecting states requested that the
court impose a remedy along these lines, promoting a requirement that
would have required "Microsoft to (1) continue supporting any industry
standard it has publicly claimed to support 'until it publicly disclaims
such support or the standard itself expires or is rescinded by the standard-setting body,' and (2) 'continue to support an industry standard
any time it makes a proprietary alteration to the standard."1 26 In upholding the district court's rejection of that proposal, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that such a remedy was too divorced from the substantive
127
violations to be appropriate.
In Microsoft, the district court and the D.C. Circuit were reluctant to
empower a standard-setting body to develop and enforce interoperability requirements that would govern Microsoft's behavior. In addition
to its concerns that the requirements were not related to the liability
issues in the Microsoft case, the D.C. Circuit explained that such a remedy was questionable on the grounds that standard-setting bodies are
imperfect institutions, often making subjective decisions and moving at
a slow pace that does not keep up with the rapid pace of technological
change. 128 This is a fair criticism, but courts will find it difficult to identify any institution-including a technical committee along the lines of
that embraced in Microsoft-that is without such drawbacks.

125Chris E. Hall & Robert E. Hall, Towards a Quantification of the Effects of Microsofl's Conduct, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 188, 191 (2001).
126 Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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l28 Id. at 1215.
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The benefit of a standard-setting forum as an adjunct to an antitrust
court is that it might be used in a manner that spares antitrust courts
from weighing into matters beyond their core competence and that
spurs the relevant standard-setting body to function more effectively. It
is indeed the case that standard-setting bodies often fail to reach resolution on issues in a timely manner, particularly where the interoperability
issues will facilitate the success or failure of particular companies."9
Nonetheless, by holding out the possibility that it would have to weigh in
on such issues, an antitrust court might encourage such processes to
move more effectively, thereby giving rise to two salutary results-a better functioning standard-setting process and a more effective means for
30
an antitrust court to address interoperability issues1
IV. CONCLUSION
Antitrust authorities are just beginning to grapple with the challenges
of addressing relations between platform owners and applications developers who rely upon the platform. The AT&T case is both very encouraging and, to a considerable degree, anomalous in providing guidance
to antitrust courts and enforcers. In that case, after all, the court could
work in tandem with a sector-specific regulator. In the Microsoft case, by
contrast, courts and enforcers were forced to develop remedial strategies in the absence of such a regulator. In relying on a technical committee and looking for reasonably self-enforcing requirements, courts
and enforcers followed a sound course, but also exhibited a limited
amount of imagination and, quite possibly, a limited degree of effectiveness as well. In short, the remedies used in the Microsoft case-with the
possible exception of the Technical Committee-did little to address
the concern that "the basic institutional and remedial forms for imple31
menting antitrust law through the courts remain largely unchanged."
The antitrust remedial challenges of the future are likely to require
more creativity, including the use of standard-setting bodies, than courts
and enforcers have used to date. In the case of network neutrality issues,
for example, former FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras asserted categorically that antitrust law is "well-equipped to deal with the competitive issues raised" in that context. 32 Taking issue with this suggestion,
129
Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, StandardSetting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L.
REv. 822, 841-42 (2001).
130This argument parallels one made by Dan Crane. See Crane, supra note 122.
131 Svetiev, supra note 65, at 598.
132Deborah Platt Majoras, Keynote Address at the Fed. Commc'ns Bar Ass'n Annual
Meeting: The FTC: Working for Consumers in the On-Line World 11 (Jun. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070627fcba.pdf.
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then-F'C Commissioner Leibowitz highlighted that "while antitrust may
be a good way of thinking about [the network neutrality concerns], it is
not necessarily well-suited to protecting' consumers against them. 33 In
that regard, Leibowitz highlighted the concern that antitrust courts
often move too slowly and lack the remedial apparatus to manage the
oversight of interconnection-related issues. What competition34 policy
strategy will emerge to address such issues remains to be seen.
For too long, antitrust scholars-both lawyers and economists-have
focused on substantive antitrust questions at the expense of the institutional and administrative ones that inform the selection of antitrust remedies. 3 5 Given the lack of regulatory bodies or common carrier-like
rules to govern the information infrastructure that increasingly is at the
heart of modern economic activity, antitrust law may well be tested in its
ability to provide some level of oversight of platform owner-application
developer relationships. Consequently, antitrust courts and commentators will increasingly be called upon to evaluate whether and how antitrust law can play an effective role in resolving "concrete problems
"design of the
arising [from] collaborative relationships" through the
36
institutions and remedies" for a new era of antitrust.
While the AT&T antitrust litigation and its effective use of a parallel
regulatory agency offers a model of the legacy response to platform
owner-applications developer relationships, the Microsoft antitrust litigation provides a window on the challenges inherent in a new era of antitrust oversight. It is still too soon to tell whether antitrust law is up to the
task of developing the institutional strategies-be it the use of technical
committees or reliance on standard-setting bodies-for addressing interoperability concerns that are likely to increasingly arise in the infor133Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Concurring Statement Regarding Staff
Report: Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy 1 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/leibowitz/V070000statement.pdf.
I4For my suggestion as to an effective strategy for addressing network neutrality concerns, see Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontierfor Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273
(2008).
5
13 As Oliver Williamson once put it as to economists:

Puzzles and tradeoffs frequently preoccupy economists to the neglect of administrability. They study issues that are interesting for their own sake, even if
the "complexities" are poorly understood and well beyond the current capacity
of the legal system. Economists, however can and have dealt with issues of administrability where these needs are plainly salient.
SeeWilliamson, supra note 93, at 279. It is worth noting that the lack of focus on remedies
extends to the merger context as well. See Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual
Regulation: ReformingDual MergerReview by the DOJand the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. LJ. 167, 168
(2008).
'3 Svetiev, supra note 65, at 594.
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mation-based economy. Such concerns, like the ones that arose
concerning exclusionary practices by railroads (notably, in conjunction
with Standard Oil), will require some form of oversight and an outlet for
addressing competitive concerns.
Historically, network industries and interoperability issues have led to
economic regulation, but over the last thirty years, the United States has
largely sought to rely on antitrust and market-based institutions like
standard-setting committees for addressing such issues. Whether this effort will hold will depend, at least in part, on whether antitrust law can
be effective in this context, thus holding off the calls for regulation. To
promote effective competition policy in the information economy, there
is thus a twin set of challenges for policy makers and commentators.
First, they must come to grips with how standard-setting bodies operate
and how to best bolster their effectiveness through appropriate government support and antitrust law oversight. 13 7 Second, they must evaluate
the comparative institutional competence of alternative bodies which
might play a role in remedial strategies and determine which strategies
are preferable. 38 In short, these efforts will determine whether antitrust
law can play an important role in avoiding the type of regulation that
has generally governed network industries of critical importance to the
economy. 139

an initial development of this point, see Weiser, supra note 115, at 3-4.
'm For an explanation of how new institutional economics (NIE) can play an important
role in this regard, see TimothyJ. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundationsof Competition
Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 23 (2003) (discussing NIE insights related to antitrust
divestiture remedies); see alsojoskow, supra note 75, at 112-15 (same).
39
1 For an interesting discussion of the historical connection and contrasts between
antitrust and regulation, see Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (NBER Working Paper No. 12902, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=963735.
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